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Abstract
We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over sets of payo⁄-allocations
between herself and a passive recipient, which represent second-stage choice problems.
The recipient is only aware of second-stage choice of an allocation. Not choosing the
normatively best allocation in the second stage in￿ icts shame on DM. We derive a
representation that identi￿es DM￿ s private ranking of allocations, her subjective norm,
and shame. The normatively best allocation can be further characterized as the Nash
solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem.
JEL Classi￿cations: C78, D63, D64, D80, D81
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The notion of other-regarding preferences has attracted the attention of economists in dif-
ferent contexts. The relevance of this motive to decision making is intuitive and has been
studied extensively. For example, in a classic dictator game, where one person gets to anony-
mously divide, say, $10 between herself and another person, people tend not to take the
whole amount for themselves, but to give a sum between $0 and $5 to the other player (for
a review, see Camerer (2003)). They act as if they are trading o⁄ a concern for fairness or
for the other person￿ s incremental wealth with a concern for their own. Thus, preferences
for fairness as well as altruistic preferences have been considered (for example, Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), Anderoni and Miller (2002), and Charness and Rabin (2002)).
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Recent experiments, however, have challenged this interpretation. For example, Dana,
Cain and Dawes (2006) study a variant of the same dictator game, where the dictator is
given the option to exit the game before the recipient learns it is being played. In case
she opts out, she is given a pre-speci￿ed amount of money, and the recipient gets nothing.
About one third of the participants choose to leave the game when o⁄ered $9 for themselves
and $0 for the recipient. Write this allocation as ($9, $0). Such behavior contradicts purely
altruistic concern regarding the recipient￿ s payo⁄, because then the allocation ($9, $1) should
be strictly preferred. It also contradicts purely sel￿sh preferences, as then ($10, $0) would
be preferred to ($9, $0). Instead, people seem to su⁄er from behaving sel￿shly in a choice
situation where they could behave pro-socially. Therefore, they try to avoid getting into
such a situation, if they can. Two examples of real-life scenarios would be crossing the road
to avoid meeting a beggar and donating to charity over the phone, but wishing not to have
been home when the call came.
We contend that whether a person￿ s actions are observed plays a crucial role in deter-
mining her behavior. We term shame the motive that distinguishes choice behavior that is
observed from choice behavior that is not observed.1 We identify shame as the moral cost
that an individual experiences if, instead of choosing an alternative that she perceives to be
in accordance with a social norm (which might include, but is not limited to, considerations
of fairness and altruism), she is observed choosing an alternative that favors her own material
payo⁄s. We refer to the criterion that determines whether an alternative causes shame when
it is not chosen as the individual￿ s (subjective) norm.
Since at least part of the choice behavior is observed by someone (for example the exper-
imenter) it would be impossible to provide a complete theory of observation-driven shame
that is based solely on revealed preferences. We thus study the e⁄ect of the di⁄erential shame
from being observed by the recipient in addition to the experimenter. Correspondingly, we
say that a person is observed if her choice behavior is revealed to someone who is directly
a⁄ected by it. Otherwise, we say that she chooses in private. The signi￿cance of our notion
of shame is supported by further evidence. In a follow-up to the experiment cited above,
1Our notion of shame is closely related to that of embarrassment. We use the word shame to highlight
that the emotional cost experienced by DM is caused by her own actions and is not triggered by others￿
actions, which place DM in a socially awkward situation. One way to distinguish between shame and guilt
is to view guilt as involving regret, even in private, while, according to Buss (1980), ￿shame is essentially
public; if no one else knows, there is no basis for shame. [...] Thus, shame does not lead to self-control
in private.￿The public-private distinction between guilt and shame is also suggested by Gehm and Scherer
(1988). We adopt the interpretation that even observation of a sel￿sh behavior without identi￿cation of its
purveyor can cause shame. It is worth noting that in the psychological literature one can ￿nd other criteria
for the distinction between guilt and shame. For example, Lewis (1971) suggests that shame focuses on self
(what we are) whereas guilt focuses on behavior (what we do). A comprehensive discussion of guilt and
shame can be found in Tangney and Dearing (2002).
2Dana et al. report that only one out of twenty-four dictators exits the game when they
are told that the recipient will never learn that a dictator game has been played. Similarly,
Pillutla and Murningham (1995) ￿nd evidence that even if their identity is not revealed to
the recipient, people￿ s giving behavior depends on the information given to the recipient
regarding the source of the payo⁄s. In experiments related to our leading example, Lazear,
Malmendier and Weber (2005) as well as Broberg, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) predict
and ￿nd that the most generous dictators are keenest to avoid an environment where they
could share with an observing recipient. Broberg et al. further elicit the price subjects are
willing to pay in order to exit the dictator game: they ￿nd that the mean exit reservation
price equals 82% of the dictator game endowment.
To understand the notion of shame and its interaction with sel￿sh preferences, we need
to identify the e⁄ects of these two motives. A simple and tractable tool for analysis would be
a utility function that is additively separable in the moral cost (shame) and the private value
of allocations, and that speci￿es the properties of the shame component. We justify using
this convenient form by deriving it from plausible assumptions on preferences. To this end,
we consider games like the one conceived by Dana et al. as a two-stage choice problem. In
the ￿rst stage, the decision maker (DM) chooses a menu, a set of payo⁄-allocations between
herself and the anonymous recipient. This choice is not observed by the recipient. In the
second stage, DM chooses an alternative from the menu. This choice is observed, in the sense
that the recipient is aware of the menu available to DM.2;3 DM has preferences over sets of
alternatives (menus). Shame impacts preferences through its anticipated e⁄ect on second-
stage choices, where the presence of a normatively better option reduces the attractiveness
of an allocation. Our representation results demonstrate how DM￿ s norm and her choice
behavior interact. On the one hand, properties of the norm impact choice; on the other
hand, the norm can be elicited from DM￿ s choice behavior.
2The observed part of the choice procedure is naturally modelled as stage two: The recipient always
learns the ultimate choice, as it determines his payo⁄. Prior to this, DM might be given the option to
constrain the set of allocations available for choice. This preceding decision may or may not be observed. If
it is not observed, then there is a meaningful ￿rst stage. The passage of physical time is not relevant for the
distinction of the two stages. This is in contrast to most other models of choice over menus, where subjective
uncertainty might resolve or temptation may kick in over time.
3If the exit option is chosen in the aforementioned experiment by Dana et al., as in our setup, the
recipient is unaware that there is a dictator who could have chosen another allocation. In their experiment,
the recipient is further unaware that another person was involved at all. It would be interesting to see
whether informing the recipient that two people participated in the experiment and that the other person
had received $9 would change the experimental ￿ndings. This would correspond to our setup.
31.2. Illustration of Results
Denote a typical menu by A = fa;b;:::g = f(a1;a2);(b1;b2);:::g, where the ￿rst and second
components of each alternative are, respectively, the private payo⁄ for DM and for the
recipient. To illustrate our results, consider the following special case of our representations:


















where u and ’ are increasing in all arguments. u is a utility function over allocations, and
’ represents DM￿ s norm. The function g is shame. It is decreasing in its ￿rst argument and
increasing in its second argument.
This representation captures the tension between DM￿ s impulse to choose the allocation
she prefers in private and her desire to minimize shame. The value of a menu is the sum
of two distinct components. The ￿rst component, u(a), gives the value of the degenerate
menu fag. Since degenerate menus leave DM with no choice to be made under observation,
DM￿ s ranking over them can be thought of as her private ranking of allocations. The second
component is shame. It represents the cost DM incurs when selecting a in the face of one
of the normatively best available alternatives, b￿ 2 argmax
b2A
’(b). Although the private
ranking over allocations might incorporate other-regarding preferences (such as altruism),
we assume DM to be more sel￿sh in private: among normatively equally good alternatives,
she strictly prefers the one that gives her the highest private payo⁄.
According to our interpretation of shame, we can relate choice to a second, induced binary
relation, ￿n, which captures DM￿ s subjective norm. ￿n is assumed to satisfy the following
three properties: Ranking, which says that ￿n is weak order; the Pareto criterion on payo⁄s;
and Compensation, which requires the norm to be su¢ ciently responsive to variations in
either person￿ s payo⁄.







This implies that even alternatives that are not chosen may matter for the value of a
set, and that larger sets are not necessarily better. To see this, let u(a) = 2a1, ’(a) =
(a1 + 1)(a2 + 1), and g (x;y) = y ￿ x, so that U (f(10;1);(5;3)g) = 18, U (f(10;1)g) = 20
and U (f(5;3)g) = 10. To permit such a ranking, we assume a version of Left Betweenness,
which allows smaller sets to be preferred over larger sets. Theorem 1 establishes that our
weakest representation, which captures the intuition discussed thus far, is equivalent to the
collection of all the above assumptions.
4Representations similar to (1) have been studied extensively in the literature on temp-
tation, starting with the work of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, henceforth GP). GP consider
preferences over menus of lotteries and impose the independence axiom. Instead, our repre-
sentation is based on choice over less complicated, risk-free objects. This domain is in line
with that of our motivating examples. More importantly, imposing the independence axiom
would be inappropriate in our context. For example, suppose that the normative ranking of
alternatives is symmetric. Then (10;0) is as good as (0;10). Independence implies that any
randomization over these two allocations is as good as either of them, while intuition sug-
gests that awarding $10 to either player with probability 0:5 would be normatively best. In
addition, the independence axiom implies that the suggested second-stage choice correspon-
dence satis￿es the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP); that is, the choice criterion is
menu-independent. Contrary to this, we argue that violations of WARP are plausible in our
context. Our most general representation (Theorem 1) does accommodate such violations.4
In contrast, if we take g (x;y) = y ￿ x in (1), the representation does feature a menu-
independent choice criterion:








This representation is axiomatized in Theorem 2. The representation puts strong restric-
tions on the structure of shame-driven preferences, to the extent that second-stage choice
alone does not reveal anything about the normative ranking. That is, without knowing DM￿ s
preferences over menus, one cannot distinguish between a standard decision maker and one
who is susceptible to shame.
We further specify DM￿ s norm by assuming that it satis￿es Independent Normative Con-
tributions: the contribution of raising one player￿ s monetary payo⁄to the normative value of
an allocation does not depend on the level of the other player￿ s payo⁄. With this additional
assumption, Theorem 3 establishes that there are two positive, increasing, and continuous
utility functions, v1 and v2, evaluated in the payo⁄ to DM and the recipient respectively,
such that the value of their product represents the norm, ’(a) = v1 (a1)v2 (a2). Thus, the
normatively best alternative within a set of alternatives can be characterized as the Nash
Bargaining Solution of an associated game. Since the utility functions used to generate this
game are subjective, so is the norm.
4In the context of temptation, Noor and Takeoka (2008) suggest relaxations of the independence axiom
that allow menu-dependent choice. In Epstein and Kopylov (2007), the choice objects are menus of acts.
They relax independence and characterize a functional form with a convex temptation utility. Independently
of our work, Olszewski (2008) studies preferences over subsets of a ￿nite set of deterministic outcomes and
￿nds a representation where both choice and temptation are context-dependent.
5Example: In representation (1), let, again, u(a) = 2a1 and ’(a) = v1 (a1)v2 (a2) =
(a1 + 1)(a2 + 1) and g (x;y) = y￿x. In the experiment by Dana et al. mentioned above, only
whole dollar amounts are possible allocations. The set A = f(10;0)(9;1)(8;2);:::;(0;10)g
then describes the dictator game. The set A induces an imaginary bargaining game where
the disagreement point gives zero utility to each player. According to the Nash Bargain-
ing Solution, (5;5) would be the outcome of the bargaining game. Its normative value is
6 ￿ 6 = 36. To trade o⁄ shame with sel￿shness, DM chooses the alternative that maximizes
the sum 2a1 + (a1 + 1)(a2 + 1), which is (6;4). Its normative value is 7 ￿ 5 = 35, and the
shame from choosing it equals 1. Hence U (A) = 11. From the singleton set B = f(9;0)g,
which corresponds to the exit option in the experiment, the choice is trivial, and U (B) = 18.
This example illustrates both the trade-o⁄ DM faces when choosing from a nondegenerate
menu and the reason why she might prefer a smaller menu.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model and a
representation that captures the interaction of the sel￿sh and normative rankings through
shame. Section 3 isolates a choice criterion from the choice situation. Section 4 further
speci￿es the normative ranking. Section 5 concludes by pointing out connections to existing
literature. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. The Model
For some k 2 R[f￿1g, let K be the set of all ￿nite subsets of (k;1)
2.5 Any element A 2 K
is a ￿nite set of alternatives. A typical alternative a = (a1;a2) is a payo⁄pair, where a1 is the
private payo⁄ for DM, and a2 is the private payo⁄ allocated to the (potentially anonymous)
other player, the recipient. Endow K with the topology generated by the Hausdor⁄ metric,
which is de￿ned for any pair of non-empty sets, A;B 2 K, as













where d : (k;1)
2 ! R+ is the standard Euclidean distance.
Let ￿ be a binary relation over K. The symmetric and asymmetric parts of ￿, ￿ and ￿
respectively, are de￿ned in the usual way. Our ￿rst two axioms on ￿ are standard.
P1 (Weak order) ￿ is complete and transitive.
5R2
+ ￿ (k;1)
2 ; whenever k < 0. In particular, (k;1)
2 = R2 for k = ￿1:
6P2 (Continuity) ￿ is continuous.
The choice of a menu A 2 K is not observed by the recipient, whereas the choice from
any menu is. We call the impact this observation has on choice shame. The next axiom
captures the idea that shame is a mental cost, which is invoked by unchosen alternatives.
P3 (Strong Left Betweenness) If A ￿ B, then A ￿ A [ B. Further, if A ￿ B and
9C such that A [ C ￿ A [ B [ C, then A ￿ A [ B.
We assume that adding unchosen alternatives to a set can only increase shame. There-
fore, no alternative is more appealing when chosen from A [ B, than when chosen from one
of the smaller sets, A or B. Hence, A ￿ B implies A ￿ A[B.6 The second part of the axiom
requires that if additional alternatives add to the shame incurred by the original choice from
a menu A[C, then they must also add to the shame incurred by any choice from the smaller
menu A. This latter requirement rules out, for example, a situation in which shame only sets
in once two allocations are su¢ ciently di⁄erent according to, say, the Euclidean distance on
(k;1)
2.
De￿nition 1. We say that DM is susceptible to shame if there exist A and B such that
A ￿ A [ B:
Shame refers to some personal norm that determines what the appropriate choice should
have been. Accordingly, we de￿ne an induced binary relation, ￿normatively better than￿ .
De￿nition 2. If DM is susceptible to shame, then we say that DM deems b to be norma-
tively better than a, written b ￿n a; if 9A 2 K with a 2 A, such that A ￿ A [ fbg.7
A ￿ A [ fbg implies that b adds to the shame incurred by the original choice in A.
In this case b is socially better than any alternative in A, and in particular b ￿n a. The
6This is the ￿Left Betweenness￿axiom. It appears in Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2008).
7The notion of ￿normatively better than￿is analogous to ￿more tempting than￿in Gul and Pesendorfer
(2005).
7induced relations ￿n and ￿n are de￿ned as follows:
a ￿n b , b ￿n a,
a ￿n b , both b ￿n a and a ￿n b
Some of the axioms below are imposed on ￿n rather than on ￿ and are labeled by N
instead of P. Because ￿n is an induced binary relation, N axioms are implicit axioms on ￿;
￿n is only an expositional device.8 The N-axioms capture basic features of the norm that
we assume throughout. Making those assumptions directly on ￿n and motivating them in
that context is natural.
N1 (Ranking) ￿n is an asymmetric and negatively transitive binary relation.
Axiom N1 rules out situations in which there are two alternatives, a and b, and two
menus, A and B, with fa;bg ￿ A \ B, such that a contributes to shame in A and b
contributes to shame in B. This implies that the normative value of allocations is menu-
independent and, furthermore, that multiple alternatives on a menu cannot jointly contribute
to shame. Instead, it implies that only one alternative in each menu, one of the normatively
best, is responsible for shame.
N2 (Pareto) If b ￿ a and b 6= a, then b ￿n a.
The axiom states that an alternative with higher payo⁄s to both individuals is norma-
tively better. In other words, the subjective norm must have some concern for e¢ ciency.
N3 (Compensation) For all a;b, there exist x;y such that both (a1;x) ￿n (b1;b2) and
(y;a2) ￿n (b1;b2).
The axiom implies that any variation in the level of one person￿ s payo⁄ can always be
compensated by appropriate variation in the level of the other person￿ s payo⁄. In particular,
N3 requires ￿n never to be satiated in either payo⁄.9
8Since for the standard decision maker it is never the case that A ￿ A [ B; she is not susceptible to
shame. Therefore, we cannot infer anything about her perceived norm, and the N-axioms put no restrictions
on her choice behavior.
9De￿nition 2 (of ￿n) implies that if truly a ￿n b, then the false hypothesis that a ￿n b cannot be
refuted in a ￿nite number of observations, as one would have to establish that there exists no menu B with
b 2 B; such that B ￿ B [fag: This renders the negative transitivity part of N1 non-refutable whenever the
violation involves indi⁄erence. Accepting N1, axiom P4, which relates ￿ and ￿n, is refutable. Axiom N2
8The next axiom concerns DM￿ s preferences over singleton sets. A singleton set is a de-
generate menu that contains only one feasible allocation. Since degenerate menus leave DM
with no choice to be made under observation, choosing between two singleton sets reveals
DM￿ s private ranking of the allocations. Although we allow private preferences to care about
the recipient￿ s payo⁄, DM￿ s norm always cares about it more. This di⁄erence is captured by
the following single-crossing assumption:
P4 (Sel￿shness) If a1 > b1 and a ￿n b, then fag ￿ fbg.
De￿nition 3. Let f and h be two functions on (k;1)
2. We say that h is more sel￿sh
than f, if for all a and for all ￿1 2 (0;a1 ￿ k) and ￿2 2 (0;a2 ￿ k),
(i) h(a) = h(a1 ￿ ￿1;a2 + ￿2) implies f (a) ￿ f (a1 ￿ ￿1;a2 + ￿2), and
(ii) h(a) = h(a1 + ￿1;a2 ￿ ￿2) implies f (a) ￿ f (a1 + ￿1;a2 ￿ ￿2) with strict inequality
for at least one pair ￿1;￿2.
De￿nition 3 is the discrete version of the requirement that the slope of h in the (a1;a2)
space is, at any point, greater than that of f.10
De￿nition 4. A function ’ : (k;1)
2 ! R is called a subjective norm function if it is strictly
increasing and satis￿es sup
x2(k;1)
’(x;y) > ’(b) and sup
x2(k;1)
’(y;x) > ’(b) for all y 2 (k;1)
and b 2(k;1)
2.
It is clear that if ￿n satis￿es N1￿N3, then any function ’ : (k;1)
2 ! R that represents
it should be a subjective norm function.
Theorem 1 ￿ and ￿n satisfy P1 ￿ P4 and N1 ￿ N3 respectively, if and only if there exist
(i) a continuous subjective norm function ’, (ii) a continuous function u : (k;1)
2 ! R,






! R, which is strictly increasing in its second argument and satis￿es
can be separated into a weak version (in which the implication is of the of the ￿n type), which is refutable,
and an axiom that requires that indi⁄erence curves are not ￿thick￿ , which is not refutable. Axiom N3 is of
the ￿there exists￿type and hence is not refutable independently of the induced nature of ￿n :
10If h and f were di⁄erentiable and the inequalities in both items (i) and (ii) were strict, then the
condition would be
f1
f2 (a) < h1
h2 (a) for all a; where fi denotes the partial derivative of f with respect to its
ith component. In this case, the de￿nition of more sel￿sh than coincides with the de￿nition of less altruistic
than in Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2008).
9g (a;x) = 0 whenever ’(a) = x, such that the function U : K ! R de￿ned as









represents ￿ and ’ represents ￿n.
Theorem 1 provides a representation of DM￿ s normative ranking based on revealed pref-
erences. This should help the empirical quest to understand people￿ s perception of social
norms. The representation captures the tension between DM￿ s impulse to choose the alloca-
tion she prefers in private and her desire to minimize shame. There are at most two essential
alternatives within a set, to be interpreted as the ￿chosen￿and the ￿normatively best￿al-
ternative, a and b respectively. For the latter, only its normative value, ’(b), matters for
its impact on the set￿ s value. Since g (a;’(a)) = 0 and g is strictly increasing in its second
argument, g (a;’(b)) > 0 whenever ’(a) < ’(b), where ’(a) is the normative value of the
chosen alternative. The representation captures the idea of shame being an emotional cost
that emerges whenever the normatively best available allocation is not chosen. The proper-
ties of the function g and the max operator inside imply that the second term is always a
cost (non-positive). The other max operator implies that DM￿ s utility will never lie below
u(b), the utility of the normatively best allocation. By P4, any deviations by DM from
choosing the normatively best allocation will be in her own favor. In other words, it is being
sel￿sh, and not being too generous, that triggers shame. Its magnitude may depend on the
chosen allocation.
We conclude this section by mentioning the main steps of the proof. We provide intuition
only for the most instructive steps. Continuity of ￿ implies that ￿n is also a continuous
preference relation. Therefore, they can both be represented by continuous functions,
U : K ! R and ’ : (k;1)
2 ! R; respectively. The combination of N2 and N3 implies that
’ is a subjective norm function. Note that by the asymmetry part of N1, if fag ￿ fa;bg,
then fa;bg ￿ fbg. We generalize this observation to show that the combination of P3
and N1 implies GP￿ s Set Betweenness (SB) property: A ￿ B implies A ￿ A [ B ￿ B.
GP demonstrate that imposing SB on preferences over sets makes every set indi⁄erent to a
certain subset of it, which includes at most two elements. Hence we con￿ne our attention to
a subset of the domain that includes all sets with cardinality no greater than two. A key step
for the remainder of the proof is to show that u is more sel￿sh than ’ and, in particular,
that for any a there is a region in which part (ii) of De￿nition 3 is satis￿ed with strict
inequality. To see this, note that if the inequality is never strict, then by P4, fag ￿ fbg
implies a ￿n b. Suppose that fcg ￿ fa;cg for some c. Then by SB fcg ￿ fag, which implies
10that c ￿n a, or fcg ￿ fa;cg. Therefore fa;cg ￿ fcg for all c. We generalize this conclusion
to show that C [ fag ￿ C for all C, which implies that a ￿n c for all c and in particular
for c < a, violating N2. After establishing that u is more sel￿sh than ’, we show that any
set A is indi⁄erent to some two-element subset of it that includes one of the normatively
best allocations in A. Furthermore, only the normative value, ’, of this alternative a⁄ects
the value of A. Lastly, we show that the shame function, g, must be strictly increasing in its





. Then we can ￿nd b and b0 such that ’(b) = ’, ’(b0) = ’ and
fag ￿ fa;bg ￿ fa;b
0g ￿ fb;b
0g. By SB, fa;bg ￿ fa;b;b
0g. Since u is more sel￿sh
than ’, there exists c such that fcg ￿ fag, fcg ￿ fc;b
0g ￿ fb0g, fc;b
0g ￿ fa;b
0g and
’(c) 2 (’(b);’(b0))). Then fcg ￿ fa;b;cg ￿ fa;b;b0;cg and by the second part of P3
we have fa;bg ￿ fa;b;b0g, which is a contradiction.
3. A Second-Stage Choice Ranking
In many situations, second-stage choice may also be observed by the experimenter. Suppose













If the function g is increasing and convex in its second argument, then our model can ac-
commodate a DM who does not su⁄er much if he deviates slightly from the normatively
right behavior but considers large deviations from the norm to be unacceptable. For ex-
ample, she might choose (8;2) from the set f(10;0);(8;2);(5;5)g and (10;0) from the set
f(10;0);(8;2)g; while she ￿nds her preferred allocation to be (10;0) when the normatively
best available alternative is (8;2), choosing it becomes too costly in the presence of (5;5),
making (8;2) the best compromise. This type of violation of the weak axiom of revealed
preferences (WARP) is plausible when shame is taken into account. That said, it is also
plausible that DM would like her second-stage choice rule to be set-independent, that is, to
satisfy WARP.
The next axiom strengthens the role of the normative value of the chosen alternative in
determining shame: the greater the normative value of DM￿ s choice, the less shame she feels.
P5 (Mitigating Shame) Suppose fag ￿ fa;bg ￿ fbg. If fa0g ￿ fag and a0 ￿n a
then fa0;bg ￿ fa;bg.
11For any set of two allocations fa;bg, we interpret the preference ordering fag ￿ fa;bg ￿
fbg as an indication of a discrepancy between what DM chooses (a) and the alternative she
deems to be the normatively best (b), which causes her choice to bear shame. This shame,
however, is not enough to make her choose b. Axiom P5 then implies that only the normative
value of the chosen alternative matters for its impact on shame.
Given P1 ￿P5 and N1 ￿N3, an additional assumption is equivalent to a set-independent
choice ranking.
P6 (Consistency) If fa;a0;bg ￿ fa0;bg then for any b0, either fa;a0;b0g ￿ fa0;b0g or
fb0g ￿ fa0;b0g:
The quali￿er says that the addition of a improves the value of fa0;bg, which implies
that a is the (unique) choice from fa;a0;bg. The axiom requires that a improves any other
(two-element) set that includes a0, unless the third alternative, b0 is su¢ ciently good. In
terms of the suggested second-stage choice, the axiom implies that if a is ever the unique
choice when a0 is available, then a0 will never be the unique choice in the face of a.
Theorem 2 ￿ and ￿n satisfy P1 ￿ P6 and N1 ￿ N3 respectively, if and only if there
exist a continuous subjective norm function ’ and a continuous function u : (k;1)
2 ! R,
which is weakly increasing and more sel￿sh than ’, such that the function U : K ! R de￿ned
as
U (A) = max
a2A
[u(a) + ’(a)] ￿ max
b2A
[’(b)]
represents ￿ and ’ represents ￿n.
The representation in Theorem 2 suggests a choice criterion that is independent of the
choice problem: DM￿ s behavior is governed by maximizing   (a) = u(a) + ’(a). The
value of the set is reduced by max
b2A
’(b), a term that depends solely on the normatively
best alternative in the set. Grouping the terms di⁄erently reveals the trade-o⁄ between
self-payo⁄, u(a), and the shame involved with choosing a from the set A,
max
b2A
[’(b) ￿ ’(a)] ￿ 0:
Note that now shame takes an additively separable form and depends only on the normative
value of both alternatives.
We conclude this section by remarking on the identi￿ability of the normative ranking.11
11The remark is not speci￿c to our model: it generalizes to all models that study preferences over sets of
12A natural question is to what extent one can elicit DM￿ s normative ranking based solely
on choice from menus. Consider the induced binary relation ￿b alters choice in the face of
a￿de￿ned as b ￿a a if and only if there is A such that a 2A, b = 2 C (A [ fbg) and C (A) 6=
C (A [ fbg): It follows from the de￿nition of the choice correspondence (equation (2)) that if
the addition of b changes the choice from A, then b 2 argmax
b02A[fbg
’(b0) and a = 2argmax
b02A[fbg
’(b0):
Therefore, a second-stage violation of WARP partially identi￿es DM￿ s normative ranking:
b ￿a a implies b ￿n a. Furthermore, enough violations of WARP would fully identify ￿n.12
If there are no violations of WARP, then observing DM￿ s choice of menus is necessary to elicit
the normative ranking of any two alternatives. This is the case where Theorem 2 applies.
4. Specifying a Normative Ranking
We now impose another axiom on ￿n to further specify DM￿ s subjective norm. The axiom is
known in the literature as the Hexagon condition (Karni and Safra (1998)). In our context,
it asserts that the contribution of one person￿ s marginal payo⁄ to the normative value of an
allocation cannot depend on the initial payo⁄ levels.
N4 (Independent Normative Contributions) If (a1;a2) ￿n (b1;b2) and
(a0




The axiom is illustrated in ￿gure 1. If a1 = a0
1 or b2 = b0
2, this axiom is implied by N1,
N2, and the continuity of ￿n. For a1 6= a0
1 and b2 6= b0
2, the statement is subtler. Consider
￿rst a stronger assumption, which is also known as the Thomsen condition (Krantz, Luce,
Suppes and Tversky (1971)):
N0






To motivate this axiom, assume that DM constructs her subjective norm based on two
perceived utility functions over monetary payo⁄s (not over allocations): one for herself and
one for the recipient. At the same time, she either cannot, or is not willing to, compare their
alternatives.
12￿n is uniquely identi￿ed from second-stage choice, if and only if ￿a is a continuous weak order that
satis￿es the Pareto property. To see this, note that (2) and completeness of ￿a imply that if b ￿n a then
b ￿a a. Take any b ￿n a. By N2 there exist c > d such that c ￿n b ￿n a ￿n d. By Pareto, c ￿a d and
by transitivity b ￿a a. In the text we argue that the other direction is also true, hence b ￿n a , b ￿a a.
13Figure 1: Independent Normative Contributions.
relative intensities. In other words, she does not make interpersonal comparisons of utilities.13
The quali￿er in N0
4 establishes that DM considers the contribution of changing her own payo⁄
from a1 to a0
1 given the allocation (a1;a2) to be the same as that of changing the recipient￿ s
payo⁄ from b2 to b0
2 given (b1;b2). N0
4 then states that starting from the allocation (a1;b2),
changing a1 to a0
1 should again be as favorable as changing b2 to b0
2. This is the essence of
Independent Normative Contributions. The stronger quali￿er (b1;b0
2) ￿n (a1;b2) ￿n (a0
1;a2)
in N4 weakens the axiom. For example, the normative ranking (a1;a2) ￿n (b1;b2) if and only
if min(a1;a2) > min(b1;b2) is permissible under N4, but not under N0
4.
Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky (1971) provide an additive representation based on
N0
4. Karni and Safra (1998) demonstrate that the weaker condition, N4, implies N0
4 in the
context of their axioms. The next theorem is based on those results:
Theorem 3 ￿n is continuous and satis￿es N1 ￿ N4, if and only if there are continu-
ous, strictly increasing, and unbounded functions v1;v2 : (k;1) ! R++, such that
’(a) = v1 (a1)v2 (a2) represents ￿n.
This representation suggests an appealing interpretation of the normative ranking DM
is concerned about: she behaves as if she had in mind two positive, increasing and un-
bounded utility functions on (k;1): one for herself and one for the recipient. By mapping
the alternatives within each set into the associated utility space, any choice set induces a
￿nite bargaining game, where the imaginary disagreement point corresponds to zero utility
13This argument resembles the idea, common in social choice theory, that interpersonal utility comparisons
are infeasible.
14payo⁄s.14 DM then identi￿es the normatively best alternative within a set as the Nash Bar-
gaining Solution (NBS) of the game. Moreover, all alternatives can be normatively ranked
according to the same functional, the Nash product.
One justi￿cation of the NBS as the normative best allocation is related to Gauthier￿ s
(1986) principle of ￿moral by agreement￿ : trying to assess what is normative, but ￿nding
herself unable, or unwilling, to compare utilities across individuals, DM might refer to the
prediction of a symmetric mechanism for generating allocations. For example, DM might
ask what would be the allocation if both her and the recipient were to bargain over the
division of the surplus. To answer this question, she does not need to assume the intensities
of the two preferences. This is a procedural interpretation that is not built on the axioms;
DM is not ashamed of payo⁄s, but of using her stronger position in distributing the gains.
The intuitive and possibly descriptive appeal of the NBS in many bargaining situations then
makes it normatively appealing to DM.15
5. Related Literature
Other-regarding preferences have been considered extensively in economic literature. In par-
ticular, inequality aversion, as studied by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), is based on an objective
function with a similar structure to the representation of second-stage choice in Theorem 2.
Both works attach a cost to any deviation from choosing the normatively best alternative. In
Fehr and Schmidt￿ s work, the normatively best allocation is any equal-split and need not be
feasible. In our work, the normatively best available allocation is responsible for shame. The
dependency of the normatively best allocation on the choice situation allows us to distinguish
observed from unobserved choice.
The idea that there may be a discrepancy between DM￿ s preference to behave ￿pro-
socially￿and her desire to be viewed as behaving pro-socially is not new to economic litera-
ture. For a model thereof, see Benabou and Tirole (2006).
Neilson (2008) is motivated by the same experimental evidence. He also considers menus
of allocations as objects of choice. Neilson does not axiomatize a representation result but
qualitatively relates the two aspects of shame that also underlie the Set Betweenness property
in our work: DM might prefer a smaller menu over a larger menu either because avoiding
shame compels her to be generous when choosing from the larger menu, or because being
14Since v1 and v2 are positive, the imaginary disagreement point does not correspond to any allocation in
our domain.
15The descriptive value of the NBS has been tested empirically. For a discussion see Davis and Holt (1993)
pages 247-55. Further, multiple seemingly natural implementations of NBS have been proposed (Nash (1953),
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).)
15sel￿sh when choosing from the larger menu bears the cost of shame.
The structure of our representation resembles the representation of preferences with self-
control under temptation, as axiomatized in GP. GP study preferences over sets of lotteries
and show that their axioms lead to a representation of the following form:
U













with uGP and vGP both linear in the probabilities and where A is now a set of lotteries. In
their context, uGP represents the commitment- and vGP the temptation-ranking. While the
two works yield representations with a similar structure, their domains ￿and therefore the
axioms ￿are di⁄erent. GP impose the independence axiom and indi⁄erence to the timing
of the resolution of uncertainty. This allows them to identify the representation above that
consists of two expected utility functionals. The objects in our work, in contrast, are sets of
monetary allocations, and there is no uncertainty. Even if we did consider risky prospects,
we argue in the introduction that imposing the independence axiom would not be plausible.
However, one of GP￿ s axioms is the Set Betweenness axiom, A < B ) A < A[B < B. We
show that our axioms, Strong Left Betweenness (P3) and Normative Ranking (N1) imply Set
Betweenness. Hence, GP￿ s Lemma 2 can be employed, allowing us to con￿ne attention to
sets with only two elements.
Epstein and Kopylov (2007) study preferences over menus of Anscombe and Aumann
acts. Their representation captures the intuition that people become pessimistic as the time
of consumption approaches. By treating state i as the payo⁄ to player i, and by rede￿ning
the mixture operator as convex combinations of allocations instead of the usual convex
combinations of acts, their axioms can be applied to our domain.16 While a version of their
main representation can accommodate the speci￿c dictator game experiment of Dana et al.,
the two works di⁄er signi￿cantly. Applying Epstein and Kopylov￿ s Axiom 7 (constant acts
cannot be tempted) to our context implies that DM privately prefers an allocation that
favors the recipient over an allocation that gives the same amount to both players, if the two
are equally good according to the normative ranking. This contradicts the central notion
that DM is ashamed to be sel￿sh, which is captured by the assumption that she is more
sel￿sh in private (our Axiom P4). In addition, due to the de￿nition of the mixture operation
on R2, their axioms restrict the private ranking to be represented by a linear function, u;
and the social trade-o⁄function, ’, to be piecewise linear with a kink on the main diagonal.
Whether or not such rankings are reasonable, many other private and normative rankings
are excluded, which de￿es the purpose of eliciting these rankings from behavior.
16We thank a referee for suggesting this connection between the two models.
16Empirically, the assumption that only two elements of a choice set matter for the mag-
nitude of shame (the normatively best available alternative and the chosen alternative) is
clearly simplifying: Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger (2008) observe that dictators choose
to make much smaller transfers when their choice set includes an unattractive lottery. In
other words, the availability of an unattractive allocation seems to lessen the incentive to
share.
Lastly, it is necessary to qualify our leading example: the growing experimental evi-
dence on the e⁄ect of (anonymous) observation on the level of giving in dictator games is
by no means conclusive. Behavior tends to depend crucially on surroundings, like the social
proximity of the group of subjects and the phrasing of the instructions, as, for example,
Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1994); Burnham (2003); and Haley and Fessler (2005) record.
While supported by the body of evidence mentioned in the introduction, our interpretation
is in contrast to evidence collected by Koch and Normann (2005), who claim that altruistic
behavior persists at an almost unchanged level when observability is credibly reduced. Sim-
ilarly, Johannesson and Persson (2000) ￿nd that incomplete anonymity ￿not observability
￿is what keeps people from being sel￿sh. Ultimately, experiments aimed at eliciting a norm
share the same problem: since people use di⁄erent (and potentially contradictory) norms in
di⁄erent contexts, it is unclear whether the laboratory environment triggers a di⁄erent set of
norms than would other situations. Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Moore (2000) point out that
money might become a measure of success rather than a direct asset in the competition-like
laboratory environment, such that the norm might be ￿do well￿ rather than ￿do not be
sel￿sh.￿ 17 Miller (1999) suggests that the phrasing of instructions might determine which
norm is invoked. For example, the reason that Koch and Normann do not ￿nd an e⁄ect
of observability might be that their thorough explanation of anonymity induces a change
in the regime of norms, in e⁄ect telling people ￿be rational,￿which might be interpreted
as ￿be sel￿sh.￿Then being observed might have no e⁄ect on people who, under di⁄erent
circumstances, might have been ashamed to be sel￿sh.
6. Appendix
6.1. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
Let U : K ! R be a continuous function that represents ￿. Without loss of generality,
17Surely the opposite is also conceivable: subjects might be particularly keen to be sel￿ ess when the
experimenter observes their behavior. This example is just ment to draw attention to the di¢ culties faced
by experimenters in the context of norms.
17we assume that U is bounded from below. De￿ne u(a) ￿ U (fag). Axiom P2 implies that
￿n is continuous and hence admits a continuous representation. Let ’ : (k;1)
2 ! R be
a continuous function that represents ￿n. By N2, ’ is strictly increasing. Because ￿n is
continuous, N3 immediately implies that if (a1;a2) ￿n (b1;b2), then there are x and y such
that (a1;x) ￿n (b1;b2) ￿n (y;a2). In all that follows, we use this stronger version of N3
without further discussion.
Claim 1.1 (Right Betweenness): A ￿ B ) A [ B ￿ B.
Proof: There are two cases to consider:
Case 1) 8a 2 A; 9b 2 B such that b ￿n a. Let A =
￿
a1;a2:::;aN￿
and C0 = B. De￿ne
Cn = Cn￿1 [ fang for n = 1;2;::;N. According to N1, for all an there exists b 2 B such
that an ￿n b. By the de￿nition of ￿n, Cn￿1 ￿ Cn. By negative transitivity of ￿, C0 ￿ CN
or A [ B ￿ B.





. De￿ne C0 = A
and Cm = Cm￿1 [ fbmg for m = 1;2;::;M. By the de￿nition of ￿n and N1, 8C such that
a 2 C, C ￿ C [ fbmg. Hence, Cm￿1 ￿ Cm. By negative transitivity of ￿, C0 ￿ CM or
A [ B ￿ A ￿ B, hence A [ B ￿ B.k
Combining Claim 1.1 with P3 guarantees Set Betweenness (SB): A ￿ B )
A ￿ A [ B ￿ B. Having established Set Betweenness, we can apply GP Lemma 2, which
states that any set is indi⁄erent to a speci￿c two-element subset of it.
Lemma 1.1 (GP Lemma 2): If ￿ satis￿es SB, then for any ￿nite set A, there exist a;b 2 A











We now use SB, Lemma 1.1, P4 and the monotonicity of ’ to show that u is more sel￿sh
than ’ according to De￿nition 3.
Claim 1.2: u is weakly increasing and more sel￿sh than ’.
Proof: First, suppose that u is not weakly increasing. Then there is b > a, such that
u(a) > u(b), and therefore fag ￿ fbg. But b > a implies that both b ￿na by P2 and
b1 > a1, a contradiction to P4:
To show that item (i) in De￿nition 3 holds, assume that u(a) = u(a1 ￿ ￿1;a2 + ￿2)
which implies that fag ￿ fa1 ￿ ￿1;a2 + ￿2g. Since a1 ￿ ￿1 < a1, it must be that
18(a1 ￿ ￿1;a2 + ￿2) ￿n a or ’(a1 ￿ ￿1;a2 + ￿2) ￿ ’(a). The weak inequality in item (ii) is
shown similarly. Let U￿ (a) := fa0 : u(a0) > u(a)g and U￿n (a) := fa0 : ’(a0) > ’(a)g. To
establish that one inequality in item (ii) must be strict, we show that we cannot have a for
which u(a) = u(a1 + ￿1;a2 ￿ ￿2) implies ’(a) = ’(a1 + ￿1;a2 ￿ ￿2) for all ￿1 and ￿2.
Suppose it was the case. Then by P4, U￿ (a) ￿ U￿n (a).
Step 1: There is no c such that fcg ￿ fc;ag.
Proof of Step 1: Suppose instead that there exists c such that fcg ￿ fc;ag. Then by
SB fcg ￿ fag, and, since U￿ (a) ￿ U￿n (a), c ￿n a. Therefore, by de￿nition fcg ￿ fc;ag,
which is a contradiction.
Step 2: If there is no c such that fcg ￿ fc;ag; then there is no C such that C ￿ C [fag:
Proof of Step 2: Suppose instead that C ￿ C [ fag for some C. By SB, there exist
c, c0,c00 2 C such that C ￿ fc0;c00g and C [ fag ￿ fc;ag. (c;c0, and c00 need not be
distinct). Without loss of generality assume that c00 is the minimizer in C (clearly a is the
minimizer in C [ fag). Then fc0g ￿ fc0;c00g ￿ C ￿ C [ fag ￿ fc;ag ￿ fc0;ag, where the
last ￿ is because c is one of the maximizers in C[fag. By transitivity, fc0g ￿ fc0;ag, which
is a contradiction.
Hence, by De￿nition 1, a ￿n c for all c, and in particular for c =(a1 ￿ ";a2 ￿ "), con-
tradicting the strict Pareto criterion (N2).k
Claim 1.3: (i) [’(a) < ’(b) and fag ￿ fbg] , fag ￿ fa;bg
(ii) [’(a) < ’(b) and fbg ￿ fag] ) fbg ￿ fa;bg
(iii) [’(a) = ’(b) and fag ￿ fbg] ) fag ￿ fa;bg ￿ fbg.
Proof: (i) If ’(b) > ’(a) then there exists A such that a 2 A and A ￿ A [ fbg.
As fag ￿ fbg, by P3 fag ￿ fa;bg. Conversely if fag ￿ fa;bg, then by SB fag ￿ fbg, and
by de￿nition b ￿n a, or ’(a) < ’(b).
(ii) If fbg ￿ fag, then by SB fbg ￿ fa;bg. Since ’(b) > ’(a), N1 implies that there
is no B such that b 2 B and B ￿ B [ fag. Thus, fbg ￿ fa;bg.
(iii) fag ￿ fbg implies by SB fag ￿ fa;bg. As ’(a) = ’(b), part (i) implies that not
fag ￿ fa;bg, and therefore fag ￿ fa;bg.k













Claim 1.4: There exists b 2 argmax
a02A
’(a0) such that A ￿ fa;bg for some a 2 A and
b￿ (A) = b.
Proof: Assume not, then there exist a and c such that fa;cg ￿ A, and (a;c) = (a￿ (A);b￿ (A)).
Therefore,




where the ￿rst strict inequality is because b is not one of the minimizers. But
fa;bg ￿ fa;b;cg implies that c ￿n b, which is a contradiction.k
For the remainder of the proof, let In(’) := fb0 : ’(b0) = ’g. De￿ne
Y (a;’) = fb
0 2 In(’) : fag ￿ fa;b
0g ￿ fb
0gg
We make the following four observations:
(1) fag ￿ fa;bg ￿ fbg, fag ￿ fa;cg and b ￿n c imply fa;cg ￿ fa;bg.
(2) fag ￿ fa;bg ￿ fbg, fag ￿ fa;cg ￿ fcg and b ￿n c imply fa;cg ￿ fa;bg.
(3) b 2 Y (a;’), fbg ￿ fb0g and b0 ￿n b imply b0 2 Y (a;’).
(4) If fag ￿ fa;bg ￿ fbg, fb0g ￿ fbg and b0 ￿n b, then either fa;b0g ￿ fa;bg ￿ fb0g
or fa;b0g ￿ fb0g ￿ fa;bg.
To verify these observations, suppose ￿rst that (1) did not hold. Then fa;bg ￿ fa;cg
and fa;bg ￿ fbg. Then by SB fa;bg ￿ fa;b;cg; and, therefore, c ￿n b, which is a con-
tradiction. If (2) did not hold, then either fa;cg ￿ fa;bg and fa;cg ￿ fcg, which imply,
using SB, that fa;cg ￿ fa;b;cg; or fa;bg ￿ fa;cg and fa;bg ￿ fbg, which imply, again
using SB, that fa;bg ￿ fa;b;cg. In both cases, we get a contradiction to b ￿nc. Next
suppose that (3) did not hold. Then either fb0g ￿ fa;b0g or fag ￿ fa;b0g. In the ￿rst
case, fag ￿ fa;bg ￿ fbg ￿ fb0g ￿ fa;b0g, and by SB fbg ￿ fb;b0g and, applying SB
again , fbg ￿ fa;b;b0g. But then fa;bg ￿ fa;b;b0g, contradicting b0 ￿n b. In the second
case, fag ￿ fa;b0g ￿ fa;bg ￿ fbg ￿ fb0g and, using SB twice, fa;bg ￿ fa;b;b0g, which
is again a contradiction to b0 ￿n b. To verify (4), assume fa;b0g ￿ fb0g. Then, by Claim
1.3 (i) fag ￿ fa;b0g ￿ fb0g, and by observation (2) fa;b0g ￿ fa;bg. If on the other hand
20fa;b0g ￿ fb0g, then if fa;bg ￿ fa;b0g, the combination of fa;bg ￿ fbg and SB imply that
fa;bg ￿ fa;b;b0g, which is a contradiction to b0 2 In(’(b)). Note that we cannot have
fb0g ￿ fa;b0g. Otherwise, we would have a ￿nb0￿nb ￿na, which is a contradiction.k
De￿ne f : (k;1)
2 ￿ (k;1)
2 ! R such that f (a;b) = u(a) ￿ e U (a;b), where
e U : (k;1)
2 ￿ (k;1)
2 ! R is a function satisfying:18













By de￿nition we have f (a;a) = 0 for every a 2 (k;1). Note as well that
fag ￿ fa;bg ) f (a;b) > 0,
as otherwise we would have:










￿ u(a) ￿ max
￿




Next we claim that ’(b￿) summarizes the impact of b￿ on a two element set.
Claim 1.5: There exits a function e U satisfying the condition speci￿ed above such that
f (a;b) = g (a;’(b)) for some g : (k;1)
2￿R ! R, which is strictly increasing in its second
argument.
Proof: Given b and c such that ’(b) > ’(c); we show that for all a, f (a;b) > f (a;c) is
consistent with ￿.
We ￿rst show that if ’(b) ￿ ’(a) ￿ ’(c), then f (a;b) ￿ 0 > f (a;c) is consistent with
￿, and if ’(a) ￿ ’(b) > ’(c), then 0 ￿ f (a;b) > f (a;c) is consistent with ￿. To see
this, we consider pairs (a;b), (a;c) and identify the restrictions imposed by all combinations
of corresponding values of u and ￿. Consider ￿rst the pair (a;b):
(i) u(a) > u(b) and ￿(b) > ￿(a). By Claim 1.3 (i), fag￿fa;bg, so that f (a;b) > 0:
(ii) u(a) ￿ u(b) and ￿(b) > ￿(a). By Claim 1.3 (ii), fbg￿fa;bg. By the formula for
U (fa;bg), a su¢ cient condition is that f (a;b) > 0 > f (b;a):
(iii) u(a) > u(b) and ￿(b) = ￿(a). By Claim 1.3 (iii), fag￿fa;bg￿fbg. By the
























21(iv) u(a) ￿ u(b) and ￿(b) = ￿(a). By Claim 1.3 (ii), fbg￿fa;bg. By the formula for
U (fa;bg), a su¢ cient condition is that f (a;b) = 0 = f (b;a).
Similar calculations can be done for (a;c), by replacing b with c.
Suppose ￿(b) ￿ ￿(a) ￿ ￿(c). Then from cases (i) ￿ (iv), f (a;b) ￿ 0 ￿ f (a;c). But
since one of the weak inequalities is strict, either f (a;b) > 0 or f (a;c) < 0 (or both),
hence indeed f (a;b) > f (a;c) is consistent with ￿. Suppose ￿(a) ￿ ￿(b) > ￿(c). Then
0 ￿ f (a;b) > f (a;c) is consistent with ￿ (that is, we can, arbitrarily, choose the values of
f (a;b) and f (a;c) as such).
Therefore, con￿ne attention to the case where ’(b) > ’(c) > ’(a).
If there is no b0 2 In(’(b)) with fag ￿ fa;b0g; then f (a;b) > f (a;c) ￿ 0 is consistent
with ￿ : Suppose there exists b0 2 In(’(b)) such that fag ￿ fa;b0g. There are two cases
to consider:
Case 1) Suppose Y (a;’(b)) = ;. Let u := inf
a02(k;1)
u(a0) (recall that U is chosen to
be bounded from below). De￿ne f (a;b) such that f (a;b) > u(a) ￿ u. If Y (a;’(c)) 6= ;,
then f (a;c) < u(a) ￿ u(c) < u(a) ￿ u < f (a;b). If Y (a;’(c)) = ; then we can choose
f (a;b) > max fu(a) ￿ u; f (a;c)g, so that f (a;c) < f (a;b) is consistent with ￿.
Case 2) Suppose Y (a;’(b)) 6= ;. De￿ne f (a;b) := f (a;b0) for some b0 2 Y (a;’(b)).
Note that by observation (2) f (a;b0) = f (a;b
00) 8b0;b00 2 Y (a;’(b)). If b00 2 In(’(b) but
b00 = 2 Y (a;’(b)), then, by observation (4), it must be that fb00g ￿ fa;b00g. The constraint is
thus f (a;b00) > u(a)￿u(b00). Using the the de￿nition above we have f (a;b00) = f (a;b) >
u(a)￿u(b) > u(a)￿u(b00), hence the de￿nition is consistent with ￿. By N2 and continuity
of ￿n, there exists c0 2 In(c) with c0
1 < b0
1 for some b0 2 Y (a;’(b)). Then fb0g ￿ fc0g by
Axiom P4. Claim 1.3 (i) and observation (1) imply that fag ￿ fa;c0g ￿ fa;b
0g ￿ fb0g ￿
fc0g. Therefore, f (a;b0) ￿ f (a;c0). Note that if fa;cg ￿ fa;bg then f (a;b) ￿ f (a;c)
is consistent with ￿, even if b = 2Y (a;’(b)) or c = 2Y (a;’(c)). If fa;bg ￿ fa;cg, then
observation (4) implies that fa;bg ￿ fbg, and, therefore, f (a;b) ￿ f (a;c) is consistent





















and b0 2 Y (a;’). By assumption g (a;’(b)) = g (a;’(b0)).
Suppose that f (a;:) ￿ g (a;’(:)). Then fa;bg ￿ fa;b
0g ￿ b0 and by SB fa;bg ￿ fa;b;b0g.
By claim 1.2, there exists c such that fcg ￿ fag, fcg ￿ fc;b
0g ￿ fb0g, and fc;b
0g ￿ fa;b
0g
(that is, u(c) ￿ g (c;’(b0)) > u(a) ￿ g (a;’(b0)) and ’(c) 2 (’(b);’(b0))). But then
fcg ￿ fa;b;cg ￿ fa;b;b0;cg, and by the second part of P3 fa;bg ￿ fa;b;b0g, which is a
contradiction.
Hence, g must be strictly increasing in its second argument whenever strict SB holds,
and can be chosen to be strictly increasing anywhere else.k
22Let S := f(a;’) : Y (a;’) 6= ;g. Note that S is an open set.
Claim 1.6: There is g (a;’), which is continuous.
Proof: If Y (a;’) 6= ;, then g (a;’) = u(a) ￿ U (fa;bg) for some b 2 Y (a;’) is clearly
continuous. If Y (a;’) = ;, then ’ ￿ ’(a) implies g (a;’) ￿ 0, while ’ > ’(a) implies
g (a;’) ￿ u(a) ￿ u(0). De￿ne a switch point (b a; b ’) to be a boundary point of S such
that there exists b￿ 2 (k;1)
2 with ’(b￿) = b ’. For b ’ = ’(b a) de￿ne g (b a; b ’) := 0 and for
b ’ > ’(b a) de￿ne g (b a; b ’) := u(b a) ￿ inf
b2In(b ’)
u(b).
Consider a sequence f(an;’n)g ! (b a; b ’) in S. Pick a sequence fbn0g with











2 to be a solution to
’(bn
1;bn
2) = ’n. By N2 and N3 , bn
2 is well-de￿ned. Note that by observation (3) and
P4, bn = (bn
1;bn






= b ’. We have
U (fan;bng) = u(an) ￿ g (an;’n). If in the switch point b ’ = ’(b a), then U
￿n
b a; b bn
o￿
=
u(b a). By P2, U (fan;bng) ￿ U
￿n









n) ￿ u(b a)] = u(b a) ￿ u(b a) = 0 = g (b a; b ’):
If at the switch point b ’ > ’(b a), then U
￿n






. Note that for any e b 2 In (b ’)
there exists N such thatb bn




























= u(b a) ￿ inf
b2In(b ’)
u(b) = g (b a; b ’):
For ’ < ’(a) let g (a;’) < 0. This satis￿es the constraint on f. So g can be continuous
in both arguments, increasing in ’, and such that for any sequence f(an;’n)g in S, with
f(an;’n)g ! (b a; b ’) , we have lim
n!1g (an;’n) = 0.k
This establishes the existence of a continuous representation









of ￿ on K with the properties as speci￿ed in the theorem.
23We now show the necessity of the axioms to the representation. The necessity of P1 and
P2 is obvious. We have already shown that if g is strictly increasing, then P3 is satis￿ed. For
the necessity of P4, let H (b) := fa : ’(a) ￿ ’(a)g \ fa : a1 ￿ b1g. Since u is more sel￿sh
than ’ and both are increasing, H (b) ￿ U￿ (b) hence a 2H (b) implies u(a) > u(b) or
fag ￿ fbg. For N1￿N3, it would be su¢ cient to show that if a ￿nc, then the representation
provides a set C such that c 2C and C ￿ C [ fag. Let L￿n (a) := fa0 : ’(a0) < ’(a)g. By
De￿nition 3 (ii), L￿n (a) \ U￿ (a) 6= ￿. There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: If c 2L￿n (a) \ U￿ (a), then maxfu(c) ￿ g (c;’(a));u(a)g < u(c), which im-
plies that fcg ￿ fc;ag, so take C=fcg.
Case 2: Suppose that d2L￿n (a) \ L￿ (a). The representation implies that there is
c 2L￿n (a) \ U￿ (a) such that u(c) ￿ g (c;’(a)) > u(a). Then u(c) ￿ g (c;’(a)) <
minfu(c) ￿ g (c;’(d));u(c)g, hence C=fc;dg.
To show P4, let H (b) := fa : ’(a) > ’(b)g\fa : a1 > b1g. Since u is more sel￿sh than ’
and both are weakly increasing, H (b) ￿ U￿ (b). Therefore, a 2H (b) implies u(a) > u(b)
or fag ￿ fbg. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.￿
Proof of Theorem 2
Given Theorem 1, P5 implies that g (a;’(b)) < g (a0;’(b)) , ’(a) > ’(a0). Therefore,
g (a;’(b)) = g (’(a);’(b)), where g (’(a);’(b)) is strictly decreasing in ’(a). We now
show that the function g is linear whenever it is relevant for choice (outside of that region it
can always be chosen to be linear). If not, then there are a;a0;b and b0 such that:
(i) u(a) > u(a) ￿ g (’(a);’(b)) > u(b)
(ii) u(a0) > u(a0) ￿ g (’(a0);’(b)) > u(b)
(iii) u(a) > u(a) ￿ g (’(a);’(b0)) > u(b0)
(iv) u(a0) > u(a0) ￿ g (’(a0);’(b0)) > u(b0)
(v) g (’(a);’(b)) ￿ g (’(a0);’(b)) > g (’(a);’(b0)) ￿ g (’(a0);’(b0)) > 0:
Conditions (i) ￿ (iv) imply that the value of g is relevant for the four possible pairings.
Condition (v) captures the nonlinearity of g: The following claim implies that the nonlinear-
ity of g must lead to context-dependent choice.
Claim 2.1: There are b a and b a0 such that ’(b a) = ’(a); ’(b a0) = ’(a0), (ii) ￿ (iv) hold
where b a replaces a and b a0 replaces a0, and
(g (’(a);’(b)) ￿ g (’(a
0);’(b)) > u(b a) ￿ u(b a
0) > g (’(a);’(b
0)) ￿ g (’(a
0);’(b
0)):
Proof: By conditions (i) ￿ (iv), ’(b) > ’(a0) and
24u(a0) > maxfu(b) + g (’(a0);’(b));u(b0) + g (’(a0);’(b0))g. This observation, in ad-
dition to the property that u is more sel￿sh than ’, implies that there is e a0 such that
’(e a0) = ’(a0) and u(e a0) = maxfu(b) + g (’(a0);’(b));u(b0) + g (’(a0);’(b0))g. By
continuity, there is b a0 such that ’(b a0) = ’(a0) and for su¢ ciently small " > 0 , u(b a0) =
maxfu(b) + g (’(a0);’(b));u(b0) + g (’(a0);’(b0))g + ".
We now show that for su¢ ciently small ￿ > 0, there is b a such that ’(b a) = ’(a) and
u(b a) = u(b a0) + g (’(a);’(b0)) ￿ g (’(a0);’(b0)) + ￿. A similar continuity argument as in
the case of b a0 applies if u(b a0)+g (’(a);’(b0))￿g (’(a0);’(b0)) < u(a): To establish this,
note that
u(a) > maxfu(b) + g (’(a);’(b));u(b
0) + g (’(a);’(b
0))g
> maxfu(b) + g (’(a
0);’(b));u(b
0) + g (’(a
0);’(b
0))g:
If u(b0) + g (’(a0);’(b0)) > u(b) + g (’(a0);’(b)), then
u(a) > u(b
0) + g (’(a
0);’(b
0)) = u(b a
0) ￿ "
> u(b a
0) ￿ " + g (’(a);’(b
0)) ￿ g (’(a
0);’(b
0)):
Thus, for " > 0 small enough, u(a) > u(b a0) + g (’(a);’(b0)) ￿ g (’(a0);’(b0)).
If u(b0) + g (’(a0);’(b0)) ￿ u(b) + g (’(a0);’(b)), then
u(a) > u(b) + g (’(a);’(b))
> u(b a
0) ￿ " ￿ g (’(a
0);’(b)) + g (’(a);’(b))
> u(b a
0) ￿ " ￿ g (’(a
0);’(b)) + g (’(a
0);’(b)) + g (’(a);’(b




0) ￿ " + g (’(a);’(b
0)) ￿ g (’(a
0);’(b
0)):
Again, for " > 0 small enough, u(a) > u(b a0) + g (’(a);’(b0)) ￿ g (’(a0);’(b0)).
Therefore, for ￿ < g (’(a);’(b))￿g (’(a0);’(b))￿(g (’(a);’(b0)) ￿ g (’(a0);’(b0))),
g (’(a);’(b)) ￿ g (’(a
0);’(b)) > u(b a) ￿ u(b a
0) > g (’(a);’(b
0)) ￿ g (’(a
0);’(b
0)):k
Claim 2.1 implies that
u(b a
0) ￿ g (’(b a
0);’(b)) > maxfu(b);u(b a) ￿ g (’(b a);’(b))g
25and that
u(b a) ￿ g (’(b a);’(b
0)) > maxfu(b
0);u(b a
0) ￿ g (’(b a
0);’(b
0))g:
Consequently, fb a0g ￿ fb a;b a0;bg ￿ fb a;bg; fb a;b0g ￿ fb0g and fb a;b0g ￿ fb a;b a0;b0g, which
violates P6.k
Linearity of g together with the properties of g implied by Theorem 1, that is, g is
increasing in its second argument and g (’;’) = 0; imply that g (’;’0) = ￿ (’ ￿ ’0). Renor-
malization of u and g yields the representation in Theorem 2.
Obviously the representation implies P5: To verify that P6 must hold, let fa;a0;bg ￿
fa0;bg: According to the representation in Theorem 2, this implies that u(a) + ’(a) >
maxfu(a0) + ’(a0);u(b) + ’(b)g: Then for any b0, either (i) u(b0)+’(b0) < u(a)+’(a)
and hence fa;a0;b0g ￿ fa0;b0g, or (ii) u(b0) + ’(b0) ￿ u(a) + ’(a). Case (ii) implies that
u(b0) + ’(b0) > u(a0) + ’(a0): Then U (fa0;b0g) = u(b0) + ’(b0) ￿ maxf’(b0);’(a0)g ￿
U (fa0;b0g) and hence fb0g ￿ fa0;b0g: This establishes P6:￿
Proof of Theorem 3
That the representation satis￿es the axioms is easy to verify. For the other direction, we
￿rst show that our axioms N1 ￿ N4 imply the axioms posed by Karni and Safra (1998).
Beside N1 (weak order) and N4 (their Hexagon Condition), Karni and Safra require the
following axioms:
Independence: (a1;a) ￿n (b1;a) for some a implies (a1;b) ￿n (b1;b) for all b.
Independence is implied since by N2; (a1;a) ￿n (b1;a) , a1 ￿ b1 , (a1;b) ￿n (b1;b) for
all b:
Restricted Solvability: If (a1;a2) ￿n (b1;b2) ￿n (a0
1;a2) then there is x such that
(b1;b2) ￿n (x;a2). And if (a1;a2) ￿n (b1;b2) ￿n (a1;a0
2) then there is y such that
(b1;b2) ￿n (a1;y):
Restricted Solvability is immediately implied by N3:
A sequence faig is a standard sequence, if for some a 6= b, (ai;a) ￿n (ai+1;b) for all i. A
standard sequence is bounded if there exist a and a such that for all i, ai 2 (a;a). De￿ne
similarly standard (and bounded) sequences by varying the second component.
Archimedean property: every bounded standard sequence is ￿nite.
To show that the Archimedean property is implied, ￿x a 6= b and let faig be a standard
sequence. If a > b then faig is an increasing sequence and if b > a faig is a decreasing
sequence. Suppose that faig is bounded away from k and 1: Let a and a be the least upper
26bound and greatest lower bound respectively.
Case 1, a > b. By N3, there exists x such that (a;a) ￿n (x;b). By N2, x > a. Since faig
is an increasing and bounded sequence, it must converge to its least upper bound, a. By
continuity, there exists a subsequence faikg that converges to x. In particular, there exists
K such that for k > K, x ￿ aik < " := x￿a
2 , which is a contradiction.
Case 2, a < b. By N2, (a;a) ￿n (a;b). Since faig is a decreasing and bounded sequence,
it must converge to its greatest lower bound, a . By continuity, there exists I such that i > I
implies (ai;a) ￿n (a;b). Since a is the greatest lower bound, N2implies that (a;b) ￿n (ai+1;b).
Therefore, (ai;a) ￿n (ai+1;b), which is a contradiction.
Essentiality: Not (a0;b) ￿n (a;b) for all b, or (a;b) ￿n (a;b0) for all a.
Essentiality is immediately implied by N3 (ii).k
Karni and Safra (1998) show (see the lemma in their paper) that their axioms imply the
axioms of Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky (1971). Hence, an additively separable represen-
tation exists, where the utilities are unique up to translation and a common linear transforma-
tion (See Theorem 2 in Chapter 6 of Krantz et al. (1971). With this knowledge, we can create
a monotone and increasing mapping a2 ! ￿ (a2) that transforms the original indi⁄erence
map to be quasilinear with respect to the ￿rst coordinate in the (a1;￿ (a2)) plane. Keeney and
Rai⁄a (1976) refer to the construction of this transformation as the lock-step procedure.19
Quasilinearity implies that there is an increasing continuous function ￿ : (k;1) ! R, such
that ’(a) := ￿ (a1) + ￿ (a2) represents ￿n. Given the additively separable representation,
de￿ne v1 (a1) := exp(￿ (a1)) and v2 (a2) := exp(￿ (a2)). Then v1;v2 : (k;1) ! R++ are
increasing and continuous, and, if we rede￿ne ’(a) := v1 (a1)v2 (a2), it represents ￿n : Note
that if ’0 (a) = v0
1 (a1)v0





2. The linear structure of Theorem 2 further requires that
￿ = 1.￿
References
[1] Anderoni, James and John H. Miller (2002) ￿Giving according to GARP: An experi-
mental test of the consistency of preference for altruism.￿Econometrica, 70, 737-753.
[2] Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2006) ￿Incentives and Prosocial Behavior.￿American
Economic Review, 96, 1652-1678.
19For brevity, we do not reproduce their argument in more detail in this paper. A direct proof of Theorem
3 is available upon request.
27[3] Bolton, Gary E., Elena Katok and Rami Zwick (1998) ￿Dictator game giving: Rules of
fairness versus acts of kindness.￿International Journal of Game Theory, 27, 269-299.
[4] Broberg, Thomas, Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson (2007) ￿Is Generosity In-
voluntary?￿Economics Letters, 94, 32-37.
[5] Burnham, Terence C. (2003) ￿Engineering altruism: A theoretical and experimental
investigation of anonymity and gift giving.￿Journal of Economic Behavior and Orga-
nization, 50, 133-144.
[6] Buss, Arnold H. (1980) ￿Self-Consciousness and Social Anxiety.￿San Francisco, W. H.
Freeman.
[7] Camerer, Colin (2003) ￿Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interac-
tion￿ . Princeton University Press.
[8] Charnes, Gary and Mathew Rabin (2002) ￿Understanding Social Preferences with Sim-
ple Tests.￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817-870.
[9] Cox, James C., Daniel Friedman, and Vjollca Sadiraj (2008) ￿Revealed Altruism.￿
Econometrica, 76, 31 - 69.
[10] Dana, Jason D., Dalian M. Cain and Robin M. Dawes (2006) ￿What you don￿ t Know
Won￿ t Hurt me: Costly (but quiet) Exit in a Dictator Game.￿Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 100, 193-201.
[11] Davis, Douglas D. and Charles A. Holt (1993) ￿ Experimental economics.￿Princeton
University Press.
[12] Dekel, Eddie, Barton L. Lipman and Aldo Rustichini (2009) ￿Temptation Driven Pref-
erences.￿Review of Economic Studies, 76, 937-971.
[13] Epstein, Larry G. and Igor Kopylov (2007) ￿Cold Feet￿Theoretical Economics, 2, 231￿
259
[14] Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schimdt (1999) ￿A Theory of Fairness, Competition and
Co-operation.￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.
[15] Frohlich, Norman, Joe Oppenheimer and J. Bernard Moore (2001) ￿Some doubts mea-
suring self-interst using dictator experiments: The cost of anonymity.￿Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organization, 46, 271-290.
28[16] Gauthier, David and Robert Sugden (editors) (June 1993) ￿Rationality, Justice and
Social Contract: Themes from Morals by Agreement.￿University of Michigan Press.
[17] Gehm, T. L., and Scherer, K. R. (1988) ￿Relating Situation Evaluation to Emotion
Di⁄erentiation: Nonmetric Analysis of Cross-Cultural Data.￿In K. R. Scherer (Ed.)
Facets of Emotion (61-77). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
[18] Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2005) ￿The Simple Theory of Temptation and
Self-Control.￿mimeo
[19] ￿ ￿ (2001) ￿Temptation and Self Control.￿Econometrica, 69, 1403-1435
[20] Haley, Kevin J. and Daniel M.T. Fessler (2005) ￿Nobody￿ s watching? Subtle cues a⁄ect
generosity in an anonymous economic game.￿Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245-
256.
[21] Hammond, Peter J.(1991), ￿Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They
Are and Should Be Made￿ , in Elster and Roemer, ￿Interpersonal Comparisons of Well
Being￿ . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200-254.
[22] Johannesson, Magnus and Bjoran Persson (2000) ￿Non-reciprocal altruism in dictator
games.￿Economics Letters, 69, 137-142.
[23] Karni, Edi and Zvi Safra (1998) ￿The Hexagon Condition and Additive Representation
for Two Dimensions: An Algebraic Approach.￿Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42,
393-399.
[24] Keeney, Ralph L. and Howard Rai⁄a, with a contribution by Richard F. Meyer (1976)
￿Decisions with multiple objectives : preferences and value trade-o⁄s￿ . New York :
Wiley.
[25] Koch, K. Alexander and Hans-Theo Norman (2008) ￿Giving in Dictator Games: Regard
for Others or Regard by others?￿Southern Economic Journal, 75, 223-231.
[26] Krantz, David H., R. Duncan Luce, Patrick C. Suppes and Amos Tversky (1971) ￿Foun-
dations of Measurments, Vol 1.￿Academic Press, New York.
[27] Lazear, Edward P., Ulrike Malmendier and Roberto A. Weber (2006) ￿Sorting in Ex-
periments with Application to Social Preferences.￿mimeo.
[28] Lewis, Helen B. (1971), ￿Shame and Guilt in Neurosis.￿New York: International Uni-
versities Press.
29[29] Luce, R. Duncan and John W. Tukey (1964) ￿Simultaneous Conjoint Measurement: A
New Type of Fundamental Measurement.￿Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1,1-27.
[30] Miller, Dale T. (1999) ￿The Norm of Self-Interest.￿American Psychologist, 54, 1053-
1060.
[31] Nash, John F. (1953) ￿Two-Person Cooperative Games.￿Econometrica, 21, 128-140.
[32] ￿ ￿ (1950) ￿The Bargaining Problem.￿Econometrica, 18, 155-162.
[33] Neilson, William S. (2009) ￿A Theory of Kindness, Reluctance, and Shame in Dictator
Games.￿Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 394-403.
[34] Noor, Jawwad and Norio Takeoka (2008) ￿Menu-Dependent Self-Control￿mimeo.
[35] Oberholzer-Gee, Felix and Reiner Eichenberger (2008) ￿Fairness in Ex-
tended Dictator Game Experiments,￿ The B.E. Journal of Economic Analy-
sis & Policy: Vol. 8: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 16. Available at:
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol8/iss1/art16
[36] Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein (1994) ￿A course in Game Theory.￿MIT press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[37] Olszewski, Wojciech (2009) ￿A Model of Consumption-Dependent Temptation.￿Theory
and Decision.
[38] Pillutla, Madan M. and J. Keith Murningham (1995) ￿Being fair or appearing fair:
Strategic behavior in ultimatum bargaining.￿Academy of Managment Journal, 38,1408-
1426.
[39] Tangney, June P., and Ronda L. Dearing. (2002) ￿Shame and Guilt.￿ The Guilford
Press, New York.
30